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AMERICAN BLOOD: WHO IS COUNTING AND FOR WHAT? 
GERALD TORRES* 
INTRODUCTION 
I want to thank Saint Louis University School of Law, Professor Joel 
Goldstein, and my good friend Sandy Levinson for inviting me to participate in 
this gathering on the occasion of the 2013 Childress Lecture. As is typical, 
Sandy’s essay “Who Counts? Sez Who?” is rich with both insight and 
provocation.1 Beginning as it does with a consideration of “‘who counts’ as 
part of the ‘We the People,’”2 his essay puts the question of the legitimacy of 
the polity immediately front and center. As a constitutional law scholar and 
political scientist, it is not surprising that he would start with this question. 
Nonetheless, as he points out, that focus immediately generates conceptual 
problems ranging from who gets to be included as a person for apportionment 
purposes to who gets to be a person for purposes of actual or virtual 
representation.3 
Because Professor Levinson is talking about the United States, he 
concedes, as he must, that the persons who were excluded from the political 
community included those who were either completely outside the polity or 
who were counted for purposes completely distinct from their own interests.4 
Slaves, after all, may have been partially counted in order to decide the number 
of representatives and to ensure Southern slave-owner power in particular and 
Southern white power in general, but there was never any question that the 
interests of the slaves themselves were of any concern whatsoever in the three-
 
* Marc and Beth Goldberg Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; 
Professor and Bryant Smith Chair in Law, The University of Texas School of Law. I would like 
to thank Professor Lani Guinier for her comments on an earlier draft. I especially want to thank 
Professor Tamara Piety for her helpful criticism. 
 1. You can pick up virtually anything Professor Levinson has written and find grist for one 
mill or another. One of my personal favorites is: SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: 
PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (1998). 
 2. Sanford Levinson, “Who Counts?” “Sez Who?”, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 937, 938 (2014). 
 3. See LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, 
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 175 (2002). “Using theories of ‘adequate’ or 
‘virtual’ representation to justify geographic districting, the Court has opined that the winning 
candidate still ‘adequately’ represents those in the district who vote for a losing candidate.” Id. 
 4. Levinson, supra note 2, at 938. 
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fifths of a person calculation.5 As Professor Levinson explains, the Southern 
delegates would have been just as happy for slaves to count as full persons 
because it would have given the South even more power in the emergent 
national government;6 perhaps power sufficient to slip the yoke of the Union 
without precipitating a blood bath. 
There was another group of persons who also did not figure in this initial 
accounting. I am going to focus my remarks on that group of people, tribal 
Indians, who were explicitly excluded from the political society that was being 
constructed. Yet, as I will illustrate, the problems of internal colonialism were 
not just problems of management; they were, in a real sense, constitutional 
problems. 
The tortured legal history through which this country has come to terms 
with contending pre-constitutional political communities highlights the way in 
which the question “who counts” is always about power. We cannot escape 
this conclusion, as Professor Levinson demonstrates, by resorting to one 
institution or another, regardless of whether that institution is dressed up as the 
agreed upon authority or as tradition.7 Such a dodge merely moves the question 
of power one step back. 
For Indians, the problem of “who counts” is complex. That it could be 
asked at all reveals that asking “who counts?” is an artifact of power. The 
question could be whether Indians have “American blood”? Could they be part 
of the political community that was being created by Europeans in North 
America? Or could it mean who counts as an Indian for other reasons? These 
are not as radically divergent questions as they might first appear because they 
both pivot around the deeper inquiry: who is counting and for what? And 
because of the nature of the political culture of the new United States, “who 
counts” also necessarily implicates the question of race. Thus for Indians, the 
question is not merely whether they are a “race.” The question for Indians and 
other indigenous people is whether they will have access to the power that 
attaches to their being a nation and not just another “race” or ethnicity. 
To address this question, I want to combine two of the categories that 
paradoxically both mask and highlight the power exercised by the sorting 
mechanism of institutions. Looking at the evolution of federal Indian law 
reveals, for example, the malignant role that race has played in our law and in 
our political self-definition. The corrosive effects of race are always evident in 
Indian law. Even the attempt to manage Indian people through a resort to a 
form of sovereignty captured in the phrase “domestic dependent nations”8 is 
 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
 6. Levinson, supra note 2, at 939. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). 
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not immune from the idea of race. It may, in fact, be rooted in European ideas 
of race.9 
Today, because of the increasing illegitimacy of race in constitutional 
discourse, the political position of tribes and Indian people are more vulnerable 
than at any time since the end of the wars of extermination or the termination 
period to normative views that are exogenous to the norms of the tribes 
themselves. Because governmental racial classifications are understood to be 
toxic, we should be wary when they are used to create a framework for 
understanding the power that tribes have as political communities in relation to 
their members and, perhaps especially, in relation to the states and federal 
government. 
I will undertake this inquiry by looking at a series of cases where the 
imposition of American racial ideology and taxonomy has been used to grant, 
limit, or otherwise regulate the political life of tribes. Race has been used by 
courts and the Congress to control who is defined as Indian or whether a 
particular group of Indians is a tribe or whether one federal program or another 
ought to apply. This use of race is independent of the tribal conceptions of race 
and its role in belonging. 
In addition, tribal history also helps us see beyond slavery while 
simultaneously showing how deeply race and racism continue to figure in 
complex ways when answering the question “who counts.” While the 
black/white division is the paradigmatic conception of race in America, from 
the beginning, tribes have revealed the malleability of the concept and 
porousness of its application.10 In short, race in the United States has 
consistently functioned as a proxy for power. For Indians and other indigenous 
people, therefore, the question of power is invariably linked to the questions 
posed above: Are Indians in the United States a “race”? Is “race” merely 
incidental to their status as a nation? Or is the European conception of race 
irrelevant to tribal sovereign status as “nations” under our law? 
I.  THE JURISPRUDENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF AN OBSESSION 
While it might make sense to begin the exploration of the political 
consequences of race for tribes by looking at the earliest characterization of 
Indian people, in some ways the use of the term “race” had a different valence 
at the time of the initial encounter than it does today. As I discuss later, the 
 
 9. The colloquy among the various Justices in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia clearly reflects 
the idea that the Indian nations were composed of people who were not just politically distinct, 
but racially distinct and somehow incapable of being incorporated into the American political 
community. Id. at 54, 66. The ideas expressed in that opinion are in tension with the theory of 
assimilation that Justice Marshall advanced in Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 589–
91 (1823). 
 10. See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 3, at 223–53. 
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“science” of racial categorization had not yet fully taken hold of the European 
imagination at the time of the initial encounter with the indigenous people of 
North America. But while the differences in culture, language, religion, and 
physiognomy clearly played a role in the treatment of Indian people, the 
modern idea of “race” as being the central defining characteristic of a people 
had not yet fully taken hold.11 
To trace the evolution of the role of race in the legal and political treatment 
of Indians, let’s start with one recent example and then work backwards. The 
case that has become known as the Baby Veronica case, Adoptive Couple v. 
Baby Girl, is particularly instructive in the unconscious attribution of race to a 
situation where it ought, at least legally, to be completely irrelevant.12 
Compare the role that race plays in the following excerpts from a legal scholar, 
a tribal legal advocate, and the U.S. Supreme Court in their characterization of 
the case: 
1. 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl illustrates the absurdity of this federal effort to 
channel non-autonomous persons into tribal communities. A Latina woman in 
Oklahoma (Birth Mother) was impregnated by her boyfriend (Biological 
Father), who is 125/128 non-Native American (most likely ninety-eight 
percent European-American). Neither Birth Mother nor Biological Father ever 
lived in a Native American community. After their relationship dissolved and 
Biological Father appeared indifferent to the child, Birth Mother placed the 
child (Veronica) for adoption with a married couple with an Italian surname. 
Yet solely because Veronica’s 3/256 Cherokee ancestry satisfied the Cherokee 
Nation’s self-set criteria for membership, the South Carolina courts undid the 
adoption placement, ordering Veronica’s transfer to Biological Father after she 
spent over two years with and formed an attachment to Adoptive Couple.13 
2. 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl is a case involving a non-Native couple in South 
Carolina seeking to adopt a young Cherokee girl (Veronica) over the 
objections of her Cherokee father who asserted the primacy of his own parental 
rights. The child was initially placed with the family by the birth mother. 
Hearings were held before the South Carolina Family Court, the Court applied 
 
 11. See infra note 41. 
 12. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2570 (2013). 
 13. James G. Dwyer, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl: Erasing the Last Vestiges of Human 
Property, 93 B.U. L. REV. ANNEX 51, 53 (2013) (footnotes omitted). Professor Carole Goldberg 
has already outlined the hazards of adopting the racialist perspective that characterizes Professor 
Dwyer’s critique. See Carole Goldberg, Descent into Race, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1373, 1380–88 
(2002). 
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the Indian Child Welfare Act, and transferred physical and legal custody of the 
child to her father. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed.14 
3. 
This case is about a little girl (Baby Girl) who is classified as an Indian 
because she is 1.2% (3/256) Cherokee. Because Baby Girl is classified in this 
way, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that certain provisions of the 
federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 required her to be taken, at the age of 
27 months, from the only parents she had ever known and handed over to her 
biological father, who had attempted to relinquish his parental rights and who 
had no prior contact with the child. The provisions of the federal statute at 
issue here do not demand this result.15 
One might not guess from at least two of these brief summaries that this 
was a case that turned on the power of a nation to intervene on behalf of one of 
its citizens in adoption proceedings that involved a minor who had been taken 
out of the jurisdiction and subjected to the power of a competing sovereign. It 
is already the law that one parent may not remove a child from the United 
States with the intention of obstructing the custodial rights of the other 
parent.16 But of course this was not an international case; it was merely the 
case of one parent, the mother, who lied about the citizenship of the child in 
order to facilitate the removal of the child from a jurisdiction in which the 
child’s father might have prevented the removal. But citizenship barely 
mattered in two of the characterizations. In the first excerpt the mother was a 
“Latina” and the father was an Indian of dubious authenticity because the 
author presumed on the basis of no facts that the father was largely “non-
Indian.” The adoptive parents had “an Italian surname.” Race and ethnicity 
pervade the characterization of the case as if any of it mattered. Legally what 
mattered was whether the father and the child were members of the Cherokee 
Nation or otherwise within the ambit of the Indian Child Welfare Act.17 How 
the mother characterized herself is utterly irrelevant except to the extent that it 
permitted her to misrepresent the child’s legal status. That is normally called 
fraud. 
The characterization by the Court in the third passage fairly dripped with 
the same contempt as the first excerpt. How could this child or her father be 
Indian when they had so little “Indian blood”? There is almost no disagreement 
that one of the attributes of sovereignty is that the sovereign gets to say “who 
 
 14. ASS’N ON AM. INDIAN AFFAIRS & NAT’L INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ASS’N, A Guide to 
the Supreme Court Decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, INDIAN-AFFAIRS.ORG 1, 
http://www.indian-affairs.org/Analysis%20of%20Adoptive%20Couple%20v%20%20Baby%20 
Girl%20-%20final.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2014). 
 15. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2556–57. 
 16. 18 U.S.C. § 1204 (2012). 
 17. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2006). 
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counts” for purposes of membership in the political community. The idea that 
“blood” counts turns out to be as much an artifact of the racialization of 
Indians as anything tribes might have constructed on their own.18 It took a civil 
war, the violence of which is still staggering when soberly considered, to 
overturn the idea that “blood” should matter in questions of American 
citizenship. 
Justice Taney asked in Dred Scott: 
The only matter in issue before the court, therefore, is, whether the 
descendants of such slaves, when they shall be emancipated, or who are born 
of parents who had become free before their birth, are citizens of a State, in the 
sense in which the word citizen is used in the Constitution of the United 
States.19 
The answer in that case was, of course, no. Those with “African blood” could 
not be considered for inclusion in the American political community. They 
would “count” only for purposes that were unrelated to their civic worth. It 
took “a new birth of freedom” to cut that link between blood and citizenship.20 
 
 18. I will discuss this later in the context of both the Sandoval and Martinez cases. See infra 
notes 51–80, 104–17 and accompanying text. 
 19. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403 (1857), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 20. The Gettysburg Address: 
  Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new 
nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created 
equal. 
  Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so 
conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battle-field of that 
war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field, as a final resting place for those 
who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that 
we should do this. 
  But, in a larger sense, we can not dedicate—we can not consecrate—we can not 
hallow—this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have 
consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor 
long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us 
the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here 
have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task 
remaining before us—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that 
cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion—that we here highly resolve 
that these dead shall not have died in vain—that this nation, under God, shall have a new 
birth of freedom—and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall 
not perish from the earth. 
Abraham Lincoln, Address at Dedication of Gettysburg National Cemetery (Nov. 19, 1863), in 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, FIRST AND SECOND INAUGURAL ADDRESSES; MESSAGE, JULY 5, 1861; 
PROCLAMATION, JANUARY 1, 1863; GETTYSBURG ADDRESS, NOVEMBER 19, 1863, S. DOC. NO. 
439, at 35 (2d Sess. 1912) (emphasis added); see also, CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF 
FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED & UNNAMED (1997). 
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But lest we think that descent does not matter for American citizenship we 
need only look to those times when citizenship for Americans is not claimed 
through naturalization or Fourteenth Amendment birthright citizenship. 
Citizenship depends on the question “from whom are you descended.” We can 
pretend it does not matter, but just talk to those who oppose birthright 
citizenship and that pretense melts away.21 
It matters so much that Elk v. Wilkins remains vital in the jurisprudence of 
birthright citizenship.22 In that case, John Elk, an Indian who had severed his 
relationship to his tribe and had considered himself subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States wanted a civic existence in the Nebraska community.23 
When he presented himself to register to vote and take his place among those 
with whom he had cast his lot, he was turned away.24 He would not be 
permitted to register because, according to the registrar, he was not a citizen.25 
When Elk objected that he was born in Nebraska and thus—under the 
Fourteenth Amendment—was a citizen of both the United States and 
Nebraska, he learned that it did not apply to him because he was born on a 
reservation and thus was not born subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States.26 But if descent matters, then whether you are born in a place that 
 
 21. PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL 
ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 90–115 (1985). 
 22. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884). 
 23. Id. at 95. 
 24. Id. at 96. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 109. Of course, Chief Justice Taney might have been surprised by this conclusion. 
After all he opined in Dred Scott that: 
  The situation of this population was altogether unlike that of the Indian race. The 
latter, it is true, formed no part of the colonial communities, and never amalgamated with 
them in social connections or in government. But although they were uncivilized, they 
were yet a free and independent people, associated together in nations or tribes, and 
governed by their own laws. Many of these political communities were situated in 
territories to which the white race claimed the ultimate right of dominion. But that claim 
was acknowledged to be subject to the right of the Indians to occupy it as long as they 
thought proper, and neither the English nor colonial Governments claimed or exercised 
any dominion over the tribe or nation by whom it was occupied, nor claimed the right to 
the possession of the territory, until the tribe or nation consented to cede it. These Indian 
Governments were regarded and treated as foreign Governments, as much so as if an 
ocean had separated the red man from the white; and their freedom has constantly been 
acknowledged, from the time of the first emigration to the English colonies to the present 
day, by the different Governments which succeeded each other. Treaties have been 
negotiated with them, and their alliance sought for in war; and the people who compose 
these Indian political communities have always been treated as foreigners not living under 
our Government. It is true that the course of events has brought the Indian tribes within 
the limits of the United States under subjection to the white race; and it has been found 
necessary, for their sake as well as our own, to regard them as in a state of pupilage, and 
to legislate to a certain extent over them and the territory they occupy. But they may, 
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makes you subject to the jurisdiction of the United States becomes an issue of 
secondary importance. 
The Constitution requires that a candidate for president be a “natural born 
citizen.”27 By contrast, if a Presidential candidate is born in a foreign country, 
he can still run for president as a natural born citizen. Apparently who your 
daddy is does matter for purposes of being a “natural born” American. A 
recent example illustrates this point. George Romney was born in Colonia 
Dublán, Mexico, son of Americans who were fleeing American jurisdiction.28 
Because Mexico applies the rules of jus soli as well as jus sanguinis,29 George 
 
without doubt, like the subjects of any other foreign Government, be naturalized by the 
authority of Congress, and become citizens of a State, and of the United States; and if an 
individual should leave his nation or tribe, and take up his abode among the white 
population, he would be entitled to all the rights and privileges which would belong to an 
emigrant from any other foreign people. 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403–04 (1857), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 27. Section 1 of Article Two of the U.S. Constitution sets forth the eligibility requirements 
for serving as president of the United States: 
No person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of 
the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall 
any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five 
Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States. 
The Twelfth Amendment states, “[N]o person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President 
shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.” 
 28. Nick Miroff, In Besieged Mormon Colony, Mitt Romney’s Mexican Roots, WASH. POST, 
(July 23, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-07-23/politics/35267650_1_miles-park-
romney-mitt-romney-mormon. 
  Three dozen of Mitt Romney’s relatives live here in a narrow river valley at the foot 
of the western Sierra Madre mountains, surrounded by peach groves, apple orchards and 
some of the baddest, most fearsome drug gangsters and kidnappers in all of northern 
Mexico. 
  Like Mitt, the Mexican Romneys are descendants of Miles Park Romney, who came 
to the Chihuahua desert in 1885 seeking refuge from U.S. anti-polygamy laws. He had 
four wives and 30 children, and on the rocky banks of the Piedras Verdes River, he and 
his fellow Mormon pioneers carved out a prosperous settlement beyond the reach of U.S. 
federal marshals. He was Mitt’s great-grandfather. 
  Gaskell Romney, Mitt’s grandfather, settled in Mexico as well, and Mitt’s father, 
George Romney, was born in nearby Colonia Dublan—raising the possibility of a 2012 
presidential race between two contenders whose fathers were born outside the United 
States. 
 29. Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art. 30(A), 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.). 
 Mexican nationality is acquired by birth or by naturalization: 
 A) Mexicans by birth are: 
  I. Those born in the territory of the Republic, regardless of the nationality of their 
parents; 
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Romney was a Mexican. But, of course, the United States also applies the rules 
of jus soli and jus sanguinis, and because blood matters, George Romney was 
deemed American enough to satisfy the constitutional qualifications for 
president.30 
Let me give you another example. The story of William Rogers reads like 
a parable of power.31 In the 1832 case of Worcester v. Georgia, the general 
understanding (if not the actual practice) arising from the holding was that 
tribes had exclusive jurisdiction over their internal affairs.32 Thus, a crime 
committed within Indian country between two Indians was a matter of tribal 
jurisdiction.33 In such an instance, the question of who counted as an Indian 
was a question not just of jurisdiction but of sovereignty. In 1845, Rogers was 
indicted in the federal district court of Arkansas for murdering another 
Cherokee.34 Rogers objected to federal jurisdiction on the grounds that the 
federal government had no power to regulate crimes between two Indians.35 
The statute under which he was being prosecuted provided its jurisdiction 
“shall not extend to crimes committed by one Indian against the person or 
property of another Indian.”36 The central element of Roger’s defense was 
dependent on whether Rogers and his victim were Cherokee and thus beyond 
the reach of federal criminal prosecution. Both Rogers and his victim had been 
born outside of Cherokee country, but both had been adopted into the tribe and 
 
  II. Those born in a foreign country of Mexican parents; of a Mexican father and a 
foreign mother; or of a Mexican mother and an unknown father; 
  III. Those born on Mexican vessels or airships, either war or merchant vessels. 
 30. Huma Khan, How Mitt Romney’s Mexican-Born Father Was Eligible to be President, 
ABC NEWS BLOG (Jan. 7, 2012, 6:12 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/01/how-
mitt-romneys-mexican-born-father-was-eligible-to-be-president/. 
  Even though he wasn’t born in a United States territory or state, George Romney was 
given citizenship at birth because he was born to American citizens, essentially granting 
him the status of a natural-born citizen. 
  “When you’re born outside the United States to [U.S.] citizens, you have citizenship 
at birth,” explained Peter J. Spiro, a professor of law and an expert on the law of 
citizenship at Temple University. “You don’t have to do anything to claim your 
citizenship. You are a citizen from birth.” 
 31. See Bethany R. Berger, “Power Over this Unfortunate Race”: Race, Politics and Indian 
Law in United States v. Rogers, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1957, 1963 (2004). 
 32. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 547 (1832), abrogated by Nevada v. Hicks, 
533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
 33. See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog (Ex parte Kan-gi-Shun-ca), 109 U.S. 556 (1883) (standing 
for this proposition, although it also began the process for a more comprehensive federal control 
over crimes committed by Indians in Indian country and the full embrace of the Congressional 
plenary power doctrine over Indian affairs). 
 34. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 571 (1846). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 572. 
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lived there long before the crime at issue.37 Although he may have counted as a 
Cherokee by the Cherokee, he did not count as an Indian for purposes of 
federal criminal law.38 
He may by such adoption become entitled to certain privileges in the tribe, and 
make himself amenable to their laws and usages. Yet he is not an Indian; and 
the exception is confined to those who by the usages and customs of the 
Indians are regarded as belonging to their race. It does not speak of members 
of a tribe, but of the race generally,—of the family of Indians; and it intended 
to leave them both, as regarded their own tribe, and other tribes also, to be 
governed by Indian usages and customs.39 
To be immune from the reach of the federal statute you had to be born an 
Indian, which of course, meant blood. Whether the tribes had a conception of 
race (as distinct, say, from clan) was irrelevant, the tribe could not by its own 
power make a non-member a member. Tribal citizenship was, apparently, 
contingent on the whim of the conqueror. If the conqueror thought to make 
descent the dispositive inquiry, then so be it. In any event, Chief Justice Taney 
could not have been plainer in his explanation that the race of Indians is what 
mattered, not whatever tribal status they might claim.40 
Blood counts, in short, especially when the sovereign determines it counts. 
Where you might be born is a matter of primary importance only if those with 
the power to say it is so determine. The real lesson, though, is that the 
sovereign governing majority—in this case the representatives of the United 
States or the majority of the Supreme Court—gets to say “who counts.” 
A. How “Blood” Counts 
By juxtaposing two cases at more than a hundred year remove from one 
another, I wanted to open a window into the ways in which the American 
preoccupation with policing the racial divide has had an impact on the legal 
and political development of tribes. It has been used to define them, discipline 
them, and to subject both tribes and individual Indian people to the categories 
that are the residue of the racialist taxonomy the settlers brought with them, as 
well as racial compromises necessary to secure a constitution.41 It has 
 
 37. Id. at 571. 
 38. Id. at 573. Presumably this result would not offend people like Professor Dwyer, who 
seem to be contemptuous of the power that tribes exercise over membership/citizenship. See 
Dwyer, supra note 13. 
 39. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 573. 
 40. Of course, Chief Justice Taney’s characterization merely confirms the idea that tribes 
were outside of the constitutional and political structure that governed the country; thus, 
membership for purposes of tribal criminal jurisdiction over other Indians was a matter of 
indifference for the Court or the Congress. 
 41. For a discussion of “racialism,” see KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, IN MY FATHER’S 
HOUSE: AFRICA IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE 13 (1992). 
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permitted policy makers and jurists to project their own conceptions of native 
peoples onto Indians and to use racialist categories to justify the legal 
treatment of Indian people whether in tribes or individually. 
The question of just how Indians would count within the political 
imagination of the Founders was answered within a framework that placed 
Indians outside of the confines of conventional domestic legal categories but 
not quite within the categories governing foreigners. Because treaties were the 
first legal instruments to institutionalize relations between tribes and settlers 
(beyond individual commercial agreements), their use suggests the recognition 
by the British settlers that tribes were people with an independent and pre-
existing political status. Indian nations did not depend on the recognition of the 
settlers for their legitimacy. At contact, tribes were the unit of political 
engagement even if, ultimately, the treaties that were negotiated were 
understood to be in a category different from other treaties.42 The classification 
of tribes as “domestic dependent nation” had not yet been conceptualized even 
as it worked itself out in practice and in the mind of the settlers. But it was 
clear that the path to peace rested on negotiated agreements with tribes and 
would remain so until the tribes ceased to be a formidable military threat.43 
 
The first doctrine is the view—which I shall call racialism—that there are heritable 
characteristics, possessed by members of our species, which allow us to divide them into a 
small set of races, in such a way that all the members of these races share certain traits 
and tendencies with each other that they do not share with members of any other race. 
These traits and tendencies characteristic of a race constitute, on the racialist view, a sort 
of racial essence; it is part of the content of racialism that the essential heritable 
characteristics of the “Races of Man” account for more than the visible morphological 
characteristics—skin color, hair type, facial features—on the basis of which we make our 
informal classifications. Racialism is at the heart of nineteenth-century attempts to 
develop a science of racial difference, but it appears to have been believed by others—like 
Hegel, before then . . . . 
 42. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLITICAL 
ANOMALY 2 (1994). 
  The United States, from the beginning of its political existence, recognized a 
measure of autonomy in the Indian bands and tribes. Treaties rested upon a concept of 
Indian sovereignty or quasi sovereignty and in turn greatly contributed to that concept. 
Treaties, as it was repeatedly pointed out in discourse about the relations between the 
United States and the Indians, made no sense unless based on recognition of some kind of 
special legal status of the Indians. 
 Id. Yet, as Chief Justice Marshall put it in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 
(1831): 
The condition of the Indians in relation to the United States is perhaps unlike that of any 
other two people in existence. In the general, nations not owing a common allegiance are 
foreign to each other. The term foreign nation is, with strict propriety, applicable by either 
to the other. But the relation of the Indians to the United States is marked by peculiar and 
cardinal distinctions which exist no where [sic] else. 
 43. The last treaty was ratified in 1868. The treaty making power was removed from the 
President by Congress in 1871 in a statute of dubious constitutionality. See Siegfried Wiessner, 
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If the civic and social existence of tribes had been created on the basis of 
equality through the medium of negotiated agreements, the history of this 
country would have been dramatically different. But the anomalous political 
relations between the settlers and the Indians meant that, despite the roots of 
the relationship in international law, Indian treaties were different. The 
Supreme Court in Talton v. Mayes, recognized that the Constitution by its 
terms did not apply to tribes, but that did not prevent the political branches 
from playing a greater role in their management.44 Ten years before the 
decision in Talton, the Supreme Court had to wrestle with the status of Indians 
and the authority of the United States to regulate their internal relations. The 
initial characterization, while consistent with Marshall’s categorization of 
tribes, seemed to open the door to much more intrusive external regulation. 
[Indians] were, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent 
position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as nations, 
not as possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, 
with the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not 
brought under the laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits they 
resided.45 
Based on this formulation, one might ask by what authority may tribes be 
brought under the legislative regulation of the federal government or of the 
states? The answer the court gives here is culturally patronizing and as naked 
an assertion of power as one could hope to find. 
The power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once 
powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their 
protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom they dwell. It must 
exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else . . . .46 
Like nations reduced to pupilage by Chief Justice Marshall, the firm hand of 
civilizing instruction must come from a political power alien to the tribes. 
Tribes are, in the formulation of Justice Miller, “remnants of a race once 
powerful.” 
The path of the status of tribes from nations with whom the settlers had to 
negotiate treaties to “remnants of a race once powerful” is marked by war and 
the use of racial categories to justify the legal treatment of tribes. 
Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this continent were 
deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and that, even when the Indians 
 
American Indian Treaties and Modern International Law, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 567, 573 n.28, 
580 (1995). 
 44. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382–84 (1896). 
 45. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1886). 
 46. Id. at 384. 
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ceded millions of acres by treaty in return for blankets, food and trinkets, it 
was not a sale but the conquerors’ will that deprived them of their land.47 
In the Court’s characterization, this race of savages was unworthy of the 
dignity of treaties or even fair dealing. Whether power is behind the question 
of “who counts and for what” is never clearer than in these kinds of offhand 
descriptions of tribes and the relation between them and the non-Indian 
governments confronting them. 
The description of the encounters between Indians and non-Indians reflects 
the conflicted stance that the colonizing powers had towards Indian people, yet 
because the impact on the legitimate use of particular kinds of governmental 
power turned on whether the people being confronted were, in fact, Indian, that 
question often loomed as the fundamental inquiry, but not one that the Indian 
people were themselves always empowered to make. Elsewhere, I have 
discussed one such case where the tribal members’ stories about themselves 
carried far less weight than the stories historians could tell about them.48 In 
addition, because the tribe had taken in runaway slaves and had integrated 
them into the life of their community including intermarriage, their “race” read 
as black rather than Indian.49 Ascription, one of the primary tools of racial 
management in general, is central in defining Indian people, but far more 
critically it can define the contours of their legal existence. 
I now turn to some specific examples of how race as a proxy for power 
“counts” in the context of Indian law. The life of race as a social and political 
category has always been complicated. The ways in which race is used, 
especially when not specifically limited to the division between blackness and 
whiteness, draws on the varieties of socio-racial types related to the ersatz 
science of racialism. Thus, there has always been complex relationship 
between Indians and white non-Indians.50 The important thing to remember, 
however, is that there are legal consequences, some quite dramatic, that follow 
 
 47. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 289–90 (1955). 
 48. Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: 
The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625 (1990). 
 49. Id. at 638. 
Runaway slaves took refuge with and married Mashpee Indians. The Mashpee became 
members of a “mixed” race, and the names some of the Mashpee carried reflected this 
mixture. What was clear to the Mashpee, if not to outside observers, was that this mixing 
did not dilute their tribal status because they did not define themselves according to racial 
type, but rather by membership in their community. 
 50. See, e.g., DRESSING IN FEATHERS: THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INDIAN IN AMERICAN 
POPULAR CULTURE (S. Elizabeth Bird ed., 1996); see also COLIN G. CALLOWAY, WHITE 
PEOPLE, INDIANS, AND HIGHLANDERS: TRIBAL PEOPLES AND COLONIAL ENCOUNTERS IN 
SCOTLAND AND AMERICA (2008). Of course, it is also seen in the recent quite public debate 
about the naming of various professional sports franchises. See, e.g., Maureen Dowd, Call an 
Audible, Dan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2013, at A29, available at http://nytimes.com/2013/10/09/ 
opinion/dowd-call-an-audible-dan.html?hp. 
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from the interplay of race and nation that has circumscribed Indians’ status in 
our political culture. 
B. Race and Nationhood 
As I have described in an earlier essay, the power to say who is or who is 
not an Indian (putting aside the question of who is or who is not a citizen, 
which as we have seen establishes a different kind of political existence) 
resides in the federal government.51 But how does a court, or any federal agent, 
for that matter go about deciding who counts as an Indian? If we are not going 
to permit the tribes to self-identify then the process of ascription has to have 
some non-arbitrary basis in order to be lawful. What is that non-arbitrary 
method? Let’s look at the method adopted by the Supreme Court. 
In the case involving the Mashpee Indians of Cape Cod,52 the federal 
district court relied on a definition of tribe adopted by the United States 
Supreme Court at the turn of the century in Montoya v. United States: “By a 
‘tribe’ we understand a body of Indians of the same or a similar race, united in 
a community under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular 
though sometimes ill-defined territory . . . .”53 By relying on a definition that 
the Court developed to determine whether a band of Indians were part of a 
tribe for purposes of the Indian Depredation Act,54 the Court crafted a 
definition that had no relevance to the Mashpee. Nonetheless, “Judge Skinner 
instructed the jury that the Mashpee had to meet the requirements of 
Montoya—rooted in notions of racial purity, authoritarian leadership, and 
consistent territorial occupancy—in order to establish their tribal identity, 
despite the fact that Montoya itself did not address the Non-Intercourse Act.”55 
Of course, the power to say who is or is not an Indian is independent of the 
particular test applied. 
Like the case of Baby Veronica, the case through which the federal 
government asserted the power to say who is or is not an Indian arose, like 
many important cases involving Indians, around an issue that was seemingly 
trivial, but that implicated the power to regulate the lives of the tribe and that 
divided political power to control the lives of the Pueblo Indians between the 
State of New Mexico and the federal government. The issue was whether 
Felipe Sandoval had violated federal law when he wheeled his cart into Santa 
 
 51. Gerald Torres, Who is an Indian? The Story of United States v. Sandoval, in INDIAN 
LAW STORIES 109, 109–45 (Carole Goldberg et al. eds., 2011). 
 52. Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp. 940 (D. Mass. 1978), aff’d sub nom. 
Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979). 
 53. Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901). 
 54. Indian Depredation Act, ch. 538, 26 Stat. 851 (1891). 
 55. Torres & Milun, supra note 48, at 634 (citation omitted). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2014] AMERICAN BLOOD 1031 
Clara Pueblo and tried to sell wine.56 Yet as the previous discussion involving 
the Mashpee indicates, the rules that are applied to one tribe are not 
contextualized in the ordinary course, but are deemed to apply to all tribes 
regardless of the difference in their circumstances. The reason, of course, is 
that it is describing a political relationship that is outside of those domestic 
distributions of political power contemplated by the Constitution. 
The Pueblo had been fighting to maintain some form of independence from 
external control, especially European control, since at least the early 1500s.57 
The effort to keep the Spanish and the Mexicans and now the Americans out of 
their land was a problem that seemed never to end. It was different from the 
defensive struggles or commercial engagements the Pueblos had with the Utes, 
Apaches, Comanches, or Navajos. With the Europeans and their heirs it was 
always a military, commercial, and legal fight.58 
The dispute between the state and the federal government, while 
complicated because of the long territorial status of the area and the conceit of 
independent self-governance that had infected the local American and Mexican 
elite, was really very simple. If the Santa Clarans were Indian, then the federal 
government would have jurisdiction over the importation of alcohol into Indian 
country as well as primary jurisdiction over a raft of other issues, but if the 
Santa Clarans were not Indians, then the State would have jurisdiction over 
tribal members and perhaps most importantly their land.59 How was the court 
to decide? 
The fundamental error in the district court opinion is one that is repeated to 
this day. If you think of Indians as a race and not a nation, then you only have 
to focus on what their “race” tells you. By characterizing Indians as a race, 
first, you reduce their political existence to a legal category of far lesser 
significance than if they were an independent or at minimum semi-independent 
sovereign. As the district court Judge Pope wrote: 
  We have, therefore, left, as the sole basis upon which federal jurisdiction 
may be retained over these people, the fact that they are of Indian lineage. Is 
this enough? There is, from a governmental standpoint, no magic in the word 
“Indian.” It has through the course of our legislation indicated a condition no 
less than a race. With the condition gone by the assimilation of the person into 
the body politic, and the release of his lands from governmental control by the 
issuance of unconditional patents, his race loses significance. If the mere fact 
that he be an Indian is of itself sufficient to justify his being held always 
subject to a species of federal police power, that power would seem, likewise, 
 
 56. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 36 (1913). 
 57. Torres, supra note 51, at 110. 
 58. Id. at 128–29. 
 59. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 38. 
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logically to extend to his remote posterity; for they, like him, have Indian 
blood in their veins calling for the national guardianship.60 
The racial condition of the Pueblos is what determines their legal status. 
This is reflected in the racialist thinking that percolates through this opinion 
(and through the Supreme Court’s later opinion as well). If Pueblo Indians are 
just as good as Mexicans, then they should have the same status as Mexicans.61 
[Y]ou may pick out 1,000 of the best Americans in New Mexico, and 1,000 of 
the best Mexicans in New Mexico, and 1,000 of the worst Pueblo Indians, and 
there will be found less, vastly less, murder, robbery, theft, or other crimes 
among the 1,000 of the worst Pueblo Indians than among the 1,000 of the best 
Mexicans or Americans in New Mexico.62 
The district court seemed to say that, while the Pueblo were racially 
Indians, that would be an insufficient and possibly unconstitutional basis upon 
which to assert federal control. Of course, the lack of federal superintendence 
in this case would have left the Pueblo to the tender mercies of the state. 
The Supreme Court decided that the Pueblo Indians were not as civilized 
or distinct from the general run of other Indians under federal jurisdiction as 
the district court would have us believe.63 The Court turned to early 
ethnographers to demonstrate that the Pueblo Indians were governed by fear 
and petty despotism.64 Not only were they uncivilized, they were obdurate and 
unwilling to adopt the white man’s ways.65 They wanted to remain separate.66 
These facts, according to Justice Van Devanter’s opinion, do not dispose the 
dispassionate observer to conclude that the Pueblos are not Indian in either 
race or condition.67 So if the Court was supposed to resolve the issue of 
Congress’s power over the Pueblos based on their race and condition, it was 
prepared to answer that Congress had such power. The Pueblo Indians were 
clearly an inferior race in need of tutelage, and Congress had taken that 
obligation seriously by providing them with the essentials of civilized life, 
even if the Pueblos had not made the best use of them.68 Merely because they 
 
 60. United States v. Sandoval, 198 F. 539, 551 (D.N.M. 1912), rev’d, 231 U.S. 28 (1913). 
 61. This kind of analysis is compellingly documented in other areas by Professor Neil Foley. 
NEIL FOLEY, THE WHITE SCOURGE: MEXICANS, BLACKS, AND POOR WHITES IN TEXAS COTTON 
CULTURE (1997). 
 62. Sandoval, 198 F. at 543. Because the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo made citizens of all 
inhabitants regardless of race or caste, who the “Mexicans” would be is only self-evident to the 
court. 
 63. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 43. 
 64. Id. at 42–43. 
 65. Id. at 42. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 44. 
 68. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 39–40. 
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held their land in ways that were distinct from other Indians was a matter of no 
moment for the court.69 
The State’s trump card was the claim that the Pueblo Indians had lost their 
legal identity as Indians when they were made citizens by the entry of New 
Mexico territory into the United States after the Mexican-American War.70 If 
they were citizens, then the classification of the Pueblo as Indians would be an 
absurd attempt by the federal government to base its authority on the 
illegitimate categorization of people. Justice Van Devanter was sensitive to this 
argument, but he felt that he had disposed of the ethnographic point and that it 
was unnecessary to address the citizenship point, since, as he pointed out, the 
federal government had long exercised its jurisdiction over Indians who were 
both citizens and tribal members. 
As before stated, whether [the Pueblo] are citizens is an open question, and we 
need not determine it now, because citizenship is not in itself an obstacle to the 
exercise by Congress of its power to enact laws for the benefit and protection 
of tribal Indians as a dependent people.71 
But this did not answer the explicit racial claim that was advanced by the 
district court. That court maintained that federal jurisdiction could not be 
predicated on the mere fact that the Pueblo people were Indian by blood, even 
if state racial segregation laws were regularly upheld at that time.72 Sandoval’s 
attorney suggested that once the racial basis for regulating Indians was lost it 
could not be resurrected.73 To do so would be to claim that other ethnic groups 
could be regulated on the same grounds.74 This would be an absurd and 
unconstitutional basis for anchoring federal power. Sandoval’s lawyers argued 
that if such a basis for federal jurisdiction were to be found constitutional, it 
would be without limit.75 Citizens and states would be at the mercy of 
unbounded federal power.76 The Supreme Court recognized the force of this 
criticism and replied: 
  Of course, it is not meant by this that Congress may bring a community or 
body of people within the range of this power by arbitrarily calling them an 
Indian tribe, but only that in respect of distinctly Indian communities the 
 
 69. Id. at 48. 
 70. Id. at 38–40, 47–48. 
 71. Id. at 48. That is an interesting argument understood from the perspective of “who 
counts.” In this formulation, even the invocation of citizenship would be insufficient for the 
Pueblo to count in ways that would both provide them with constitutional protections and provide 
protection from an acquisitive state. 
 72. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 73. United States v. Sandoval, 198 F. 539, 548 (D.N.M. 1912), rev’d, 231 U.S. 28 (1913). 
 74. Id. at 549. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1034 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1017 
questions whether, to what extent, and for what time they shall be recognized 
and dealt with as dependent tribes requiring the guardianship and protection of 
the United States are to be determined by Congress, and not by the courts.77 
The district court had made a fundamental error in thinking it was within either 
the province of the court or the state to determine who was or was not an 
Indian; the Supreme Court was merely saying that it had to decide whether 
these particular people were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal 
government. The decision was really one that Congress made.78 Congress and 
not the state could decide whether further superintendence was required, but 
the identity of the Pueblo Indians as Indian did not hinge on the degree of 
solicitude shown by the non-Indian neighbors of the Pueblos.79 
The Supreme Court used law office anthropology to determine that the 
Pueblo were racially Indian,80 and once that decision was made it could not be 
second guessed by state or territorial authorities, and the federal legislature 
alone had the power to manage the affairs or resources of the tribes. 
Morton v. Mancari81 was decided in 1974 almost a hundred years after 
Sandoval. Nevertheless, race still paved the way. The Court, in fact, underlined 
the role of race and the peculiar place that “blood” plays in the construction of 
tribal membership and the ways in which that membership insulates tribes 
from some conventional constitutional categories. In the discussion of 
Mancari, keep in mind the almost modern argument that the district court 
made in suggesting that regulating Indians on the basis of a racial or 
ethnographic category would be dangerous to our constitutional order.82 Of 
course, as is usually the case, this argument was not really advanced on behalf 
of the tribes, but on behalf of those who wanted access to the resources the 
tribes controlled.83 
The case involved a challenge to a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Indian 
preference in training, promotion, and hiring as well as for lateral hiring at the 
Bureau.84 Certain non-Indian BIA employees claimed that the preference was 
unconstitutional as well as in violation of federal anti-discrimination statutes.85 
 
 77. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913). 
 78. Id. at 47. 
 79. Id. at 45–47. 
 80. Id. at 39. 
 81. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
 82. Mancari v. Morton, 359 F. Supp. 585, 590–91 (D.N.M. 1973), rev’d, 417 U.S. 535 
(1974). 
 83. We could take a detour into the current Supreme Court jurisprudence of employment 
discrimination or affirmative action more generally to examine “who counts” through an entirely 
different lens. My sense is that the conclusion in the previous sentence would remain largely 
unchanged. 
 84. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 538–39. 
 85. Id. at 539. 
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The preference was predicated on the Indian Reorganization Act,86 and, under 
the regulations adopted by the BIA to be eligible for the preference, an 
applicant had to be from a federally recognized tribe with more than one-
quarter Indian blood.87 To the challengers this requirement seemed a clear case 
of racial preference.88 Nonetheless, the Court upheld the preference.89 
As described by Professor Goldberg in her analysis of the case, the Court 
having just sidestepped affirmative action in the DeFunis case was not eager to 
fully engage the question of racial preferences, especially in a case involving 
the federal government.90 As Professor Frickey has demonstrated on strictly 
formal grounds, the BIA preference was vulnerable to attack.91 But formalism 
is not the province of federal Indian law. 
  If the “life of the law” for legal formalists is logic and for legal pragmatists 
is experience, then federal Indian law is for neither. More than any other field 
of public law, federal Indian law is characterized by doctrinal incoherence and 
doleful incidents. Its principles aggregate into competing clusters of 
inconsistent norms, and its practical effect has been to legitimate the 
colonization of this continent—the displacement of its native peoples—by the 
descendants of Europeans.92 
But what was the way out for the Court? The language of “blood” in the 
regulations clearly indicates a descent requirement, and, as the Court has 
indicated, “descent” is just a proxy for race and is thus suspect as a 
governmental classification.93 The way out was actually dictated by the same 
conflicted treatment of Indians reflected in the Sandoval case. Indians were a 
race of people, but that race permitted them to be classified as “tribal” and thus 
capable of being dealt with as a political entity. The treaty clause of the 
Constitution and the practice of dealing with tribes through treaties suggested 
that they had a political existence that was, perhaps, derivative of their race but 
not dependent on it.94 The regulation thus seemed to be addressing the same 
fear that the court addressed in Rogers: being Indian had to mean something 
 
 86. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1934). 
 87. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24. 
 88. See Carole Goldberg, What’s Race Got to Do With It? The Story of Morton v. Mancari, 
in INDIAN LAW STORIES 397, 405 (Goldberg et al. eds., 2011). 
 89. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555. 
 90. Goldberg, supra note 88, at 389, 402; DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319–20 
(1974); see also, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 91. Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in 
Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754, 1762 (1997). 
 92. Id. at 1754 (footnotes omitted). 
 93. See discussion of Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000), infra notes 133–42 and 
accompanying text. 
 94. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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that entailed race and not just political membership. This conflation clearly put 
the court in a difficult position. 
What the Court did in Mancari was to prioritize politics. Drawing on the 
same power it described in Sandoval, the political departments of government 
could determine who was or was not an Indian and, on the basis of the federal 
recognition process, could determine to deal with Indians in their role as 
members of a political group and not as members of a racial group. As 
Professor Frickey put it: “Morton v. Mancari fares equally poorly when 
subjected to critical light. It is rooted in a double-barreled cluster of 
constitutional fictions, some purporting to support federal power over Indians 
in the first place, and others ignoring the ethnic quality of the classification at 
issue in that case.”95 
Mancari may provide safe harbor for the BIA’s Indian preference but only 
because the Court ignores the racial dimension of the preference. It did not do 
this in the straightforward way of saying that the Equal Protection Clause by its 
terms applies only to the states. Instead, it avoided the question completely. 
Once the political dimension of the relationship could be asserted as the 
principal basis for the preference, the characteristics necessary for making that 
political judgment could melt into the background. This was exactly the 
problem that the district court in Sandoval claimed damned the classification 
scheme that stripped the state of jurisdiction over the Santa Clara Pueblo.96 But 
as the Court noted in Adarand, there are some political judgments that are 
beyond the Court to reconsider; apparently the use of race as regards to Indians 
and other groups subject to the plenary power of the federal government were 
these types of judgments.97 
Race matters in determining “who counts” but only to satisfy the 
objectives of the one doing the counting. As I suggested earlier, how race is 
used is always a question of power. The techniques for wielding that power 
may be more or less sophisticated. Power involves not just power over the 
objects of regulation, but those objects become instruments for apportioning 
power among the powerful. 
I now turn to three more cases that suggest different ways in which race 
matters for Indians in ways that complicate the discussion, but which at root 
 
 95. Frickey, supra note 91, at 1760. 
 96. United States v. Sandoval, 198 F. 539, 549 (D.N.M. 1912), rev’d, 231 U.S. 28 (1913). 
 97. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217 (1995) (quoting United States v. 
Paradise, 480 U. S. 149, 166 n.16 (1987) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (“[T]he reach of the 
equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment is coextensive with that of the Fourteenth”); 
see also id. at 217–18: 
We do not understand a few contrary suggestions appearing in cases in which we found 
special deference to the political branches of the Federal Government to be appropriate, 
e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100, 101–02, n. 21 (1976) (federal power 
over immigration), to detract from this general rule. 
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still point to the deformations of high-minded commitments to principles that 
we think of as fundamental to our system of political life. 
II.  GIVING AND TAKING AWAY 
The following cases suggest that the use of race has a troubled history in 
Indian law, but what is really at play is the troubled history with race that has 
bedeviled this country from its inception.98 The history of European settlement 
and colonization of the United States is not limited to the contiguous forty-
eight states, but it extends to the time and context that brought other territories 
into American jurisdiction, which had profound effects on the characterization 
of the indigenous people encountered there. The tribes in the contiguous forty-
eight states were subject to often head-snapping changes in federal policy.99 
With the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)100 Congress tried 
to insert U.S. Constitutional protections between tribal members and their 
government. Apparently Congress was concerned about the abuses tribal 
governments might be committing by failing to conform their procedures and 
habits of governance to constitutional norms.101 While it might be easy to 
understand this invasion of tribal autonomy as an expression of the termination 
ethos that was driving federal policy at the time, it also reflects the complicated 
relationship between tribes as separate political communities and the plenary 
supervisory authority of the federal government. One of the difficulties that 
emerged immediately was the diametrical opposition between exogenous 
norms and the indigenous tribal norms. The cardinal example is the First 
Amendment.102 The federal prohibition on laws establishing or burdening the 
free exercise of religion would, if adopted uncritically, make some theocratic 
tribal governments illegitimate.103 ICRA took some of these differences into 
account and established limits of tribal criminal jurisdiction. One of the 
provisions was a version of the equal protection clause.104 Relying on this 
 
 98. See, e.g., NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (1995); KAREN BRODKIN, 
HOW JEWS BECAME WHITE FOLKS AND WHAT THAT SAYS ABOUT RACE IN AMERICA (1998). 
 99. ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 79–166 (2d ed. 2010) 
(beginning its treatment of federal Indian law by periodizing federal policy towards Indians). 
 100. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1302 (1970). 
 101. See Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal 
Governments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1343, 1355–57 (1969). 
 102. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The text of the First Amendment is inter alia: “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” 
 103. The prohibition on the establishment of religion, for example, would have prevented the 
religious leaders, the Kikmongwi, from exercising any Hopi governmental power. See 
CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE HOPI TRIBE ARIZONA Dec. 19, 1936, art. 3, § 3. 
 104. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (2006) (“No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government 
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any 
person of liberty or property without due process of law.”). 
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provision in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, Julia Martinez challenged a tribal 
membership rule that excluded her children from membership.105 The 
ordinance in question established a patrilineal requirement for children born of 
a mixed marriage.106 Julia Martinez, a Santa Clara native, had married Myles 
Martinez, a Navajo.107 According to the ordinance, the children of this 
marriage would not be Santa Claran.108 While this exclusion would 
undoubtedly have become an issue at some point, it became particularly acute 
when one of the Martinez children needed specialized medical care that tribal 
membership would have facilitated.109 
In Martinez, Julia Martinez claimed that she had been denied equal 
protection of the law in part because of her gender.110 In an opinion that 
seemed to satisfy no one, Justice Marshall held that because ICRA did not 
provide a remedy, it could not order an injunction and thus subject the tribe to 
all of the remedies available under federal law.111 To do so would interfere 
with the internal affairs of the tribe and would be so intrusive that it would 
compromise the integrity of the tribe.112 Of course, the passage of ICRA itself 
compromised the integrity of tribes, but the Court declined to exacerbate the 
problem. The denial of a federal remedy did not leave Ms. Martinez without a 
remedy; instead, she would have access to tribal processes. As Justice Marshall 
noted: “Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums 
for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and 
property interests of both Indians and non-Indians.”113 
One of the ironies revealed by this case is how race was used both to 
constitute the tribes (Sandoval, again) and to ultimately permit the children to 
gain access to Indian Health Service care despite being denied membership in 
either the mother’s or father’s tribe.114 What was the work that race was doing 
here? A deeper analysis of the case reveals that the ordinance that later became 
the subject of the suit brought by Ms. Martinez was adopted by the Pueblo in 
order to control the loss of the land resource to non-Indians.115 By controlling 
 
 105. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 51 (1978). 
 106. Id. at 52 n.2. 
 107. Id. at 52; Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5, 12 (D.N.M. 1975), rev’d, 540 
F. 2d 1049 (10th Cir. 1976), rev’d, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
 108. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 52. 
 109. Gloria Valencia-Weber, Three Stories in One: The Story of Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 451, 453 (Goldberg et al. eds., 2011). 
 110. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 51. 
 111. Id. at 61. 
 112. Id. at 66–67. 
 113. Id. at 65. 
 114. Valencia-Weber, supra note 109, at 488. 
 115. See Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5, 15–16 (D.N.M. 1975), rev’d, 540 F. 
2d 1049 (10th Cir. 1976), rev’d, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
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membership in the way that it did, the tribe was attempting to preserve its 
community and its resources by using descent to regulate membership. Who 
counts for this community was a very specific question with quite concrete 
implications. The Pueblo had a long history of resisting predatory outsiders.116 
Moreover, it is not an isolated memory but a part of the DNA in the history of 
the European encounters with native people.117 
There are indigenous people in all of the territories that became states. In 
Alaska, native claims were addressed with the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act118 (among other statutes), but Hawaiian natives have not fared 
as well. 
Hawaii was first occupied by people from other pacific islands over a 
thousand years ago.119 Before European contact, native Hawaiians developed a 
complex economic and political system that in many ways resembled the 
feudalism of Europe (before the Statute of Quia Emptores) with the major 
difference being that those at the bottom of the economic system were not tied 
to the land.120 While estimates vary, some suggest that about 300,000 people 
inhabited the islands at the time of European contact.121 Even after contact, the 
Hawaiian monarchy was recognized as the sovereign power in the islands.122 
When the crown lands were distributed in what came to be called the Great 
Mahele, many native Hawaiians were effectively dispossessed.123 To 
ameliorate the condition of native Hawaiians, Congress created the Hawaiian 
Homes Commission in order to provide a land base for native Hawaiians.124 
The Hawaiian Homes Commission Act set aside about 200,000 acres of public 
lands and created a program of loans and long-term leases for the benefit of 
native Hawaiians.125 “The Act defined ‘native Hawaiian[s]’ to include ‘any 
descendant of not less than one-half part of the blood of the races inhabiting 
the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778.’”126 When Hawaii was admitted to the 
 
 116. See Torres, supra note 51, at 145. 
 117. For accounts of particularly brutal uses of marriage and murder to obtain tribal 
resources, see LAWRENCE J. HOGAN, THE OSAGE INDIAN MURDERS (2d. ed. 1998) and DENNIS 
MCAULIFFE, JR., BLOODLAND: A FAMILY STORY OF OIL, GREED AND MURDER ON THE OSAGE 
RESERVATION (Council Oak Books 1999) (1994). 
 118. 43 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006). 
 119. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §4.07[4][b], at 365 (Nell Jessup 
Newton et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK]. 
 120. Id. at 365–66. 
 121. ROBERT C. SCHMITT, DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS OF HAWAII: 1778–1965 10 (1968). 
 122. COHEN’ S HANDBOOK, supra note 119, §4.07[4][b], at 366. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 369 & n.1348 (referencing Hawaii Homes Commission Act, 42 Stat. 108 (1959) 
(formerly codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. §§ 691–718 (1958)) (omitted from codification upon 
admission of Hawai’i to the Union in 1959) (set out in full as amended at 1 Haw. Rev. Stat. 191)). 
 125. Id. at 369–70. 
 126. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 507 (2000). 
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Union, it agreed to adopt the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act as part of its 
own Constitution.127 The income from the management of the lands set aside 
by the act went either for the betterment of native Hawaiians or for 
education.128 
In 1978, Hawaii amended its constitution to create the Office of Hawaiian 
Affairs.129 The State vested the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) with broad 
authority to administer a twenty percent share of the revenue from the 1.2 
million acres of lands granted to the State pursuant to the Admission Act, 
which OHA is required to administer “for the betterment of the conditions of 
native Hawaiians,”130 as well as any other funds that may be received for the 
benefit of “native Hawaiians” and “Hawaiians.”131 
These provisions were created with the express intention of ameliorating 
the oppressive effects of colonialism on Native Hawaiians and to give them the 
wherewithal to participate more fully in the life of the state.132 The difficulty 
arose when the mechanism for managing the OHA was created. To quote the 
Court at length: 
  OHA is overseen by a nine-member board of trustees, the members of 
which “shall be Hawaiians” and—presenting the precise issue in this case—
shall be “elected by qualified voters who are Hawaiians, as provided by law.” 
Haw. Const., Art. XII, § 5; see Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 13D–1, 13D–3(b)(1) (1993). 
The term “Hawaiian” is defined by statute: 
“‘Hawaiian’ means any descendant of the aboriginal peoples inhabiting the 
Hawaiian Islands which exercised sovereignty and subsisted in the 
Hawaiian Islands in 1778, and which peoples thereafter have continued to 
reside in Hawaii.” §10–2. 
The statute defines “native Hawaiian” as follows: 
“‘Native Hawaiian’ means any descendant of not less than one-half part of the 
races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778, as defined by the 
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended; provided that the term 
identically refers to the descendants of such blood quantum of such aboriginal 
peoples which exercised sovereignty and subsisted in the Hawaiian Islands in 
1778 and which peoples thereafter continued to reside in Hawaii.”133 
In the case of Rice v. Cayetano, Harold Rice, a citizen of Hawaii who did 
not qualify as Hawaiian or Native Hawaiian under the terms of the Act set out 
 
 127. See HAW. CONST. art. XII, §§ 1–3. 
 128. COHEN’ S HANDBOOK, supra note 119, §4.07[4][b], at 369. 
 129. HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 5. 
 130. Rice, 528 U.S. at 509 (referencing HAW. REV. STAT. §10–13.5 (1993)); see also HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 10–3 (1993). 
 131. HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 6. 
 132. COHEN’ S HANDBOOK, supra note 119, §4.07[4][b]–[c], at 370–71. 
 133. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 509–10 (2000). 
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above, tried to register to vote in the election, but was refused.134 Rice came 
from an old family, but could not claim Native Hawaiian status.135 He sued 
claiming race discrimination. He lost in the lower court because of the trust 
duty the state and the federal government owed to Native Hawaiians.136 The 
district court expressly adopted the trust responsibility by suggesting that 
Native Hawaiians bore the same relationship to the government as tribes.137 On 
the basis of that trust duty, the lower court reasoned that any special treatment 
was a function of the political relationship, not a function of race.138 
It is important to remember the genesis of the limiting requirement found 
in the OHA and the justification for it. Its origins lie in the Act passed by 
Congress and imposed upon the new state upon entry to the Union. The 
resources managed by the OHA were for the benefit of Native Hawaiians. By 
putting the management of the resources in the hands of the beneficiaries, the 
Act merely treated Native Hawaiians as tribes would be treated: self-
management, especially of resources, is a critical component of self-
governance even if it is bounded by trust supervision.139 Descent, which was 
critical for determining the legitimacy of membership in tribes according to the 
federal government in its regulation of indigenous people in the contiguous 
forty-eight states, somehow became a radioactive racial qualifier in Hawaii.140 
The voting scheme proposed by the State in its creation of the OHA, 
because it was an election run by the state (there being no federally recognized 
tribes in Hawaii despite the genesis of the distinctive state status of “Native 
Hawaiian”), violated the Fifteenth Amendment and offended the race neutral 
norms of the Constitution. “The ancestral inquiry mandated by the State is 
forbidden by the Fifteenth Amendment for the further reason that the use of 
racial classifications is corruptive of the whole legal order democratic elections 
seek to preserve.”141 Their tender concern for the condition of Native 
Hawaiians is expressed as the fundamental revulsion for all racial 
categorization: 
The ancestral inquiry mandated by the State implicates the same grave 
concerns as a classification specifying a particular race by name. One of the 
principal reasons race is treated as a forbidden classification is that it demeans 
 
 134. Id. at 510. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 511. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Rice, 528 U.S. at 511. 
 139. COHEN’ S HANDBOOK, supra note 119, §4.07[4][b]–[f], at 365–86. 
 140. Rice, 528 U.S. at 539–40 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 141. Id. at 517 (majority opinion). 
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the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or 
her own merit and essential qualities.142 
The corrosive power of ignoring the political reasons for deciding “who counts 
and for what” is particularly evident in this case. The material resources that 
might actually be used for the benefit of Native Hawaiians cannot be managed 
by the people for whom the resources were set aside. There are analogies to 
this kind of supervision in the trust cases governing Indian resources, but rarely 
is the justification done with resort to modern appeals to race. Apparently, race 
“counts” for determining who is an Indian, but indigenous people of lands 
colonized post continental conquest do not “count” as Indians.143 To be an 
Indian in this context is to describe a specific political relationship, and there is 
a historical limit to the creation of that relationship. The next case shows just 
how malleable that historical limitation is. 
The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), enacted in 1934, authorizes, among 
other things, the Secretary of Interior to acquire land and hold it in trust “for 
the purpose of providing land for Indians,”144 and defines “Indian” to “include 
all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe 
now under Federal jurisdiction.”145 The Narragansett Tribe, inhabitants of the 
territory that was to become Rhode Island, was placed under the Colony of 
Rhode Island’s formal guardianship in 1709.146 Like many New England 
tribes, it relinquished its tribal authority and “sold” all but two acres of its 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. For another expression of this, see Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 
U.S. 520, 530 n.5 (1998), and what I consider its infamous footnote five: 
  In attempting to defend the Court of Appeals’ judgment, the Tribe asks us to adopt a 
different conception of the term “dependent Indian communities.” Borrowing from Chief 
Justice Marshall’s seminal opinions in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1 (1831), and 
Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 (1832), the Tribe argues that the term refers to political 
dependence, and that Indian country exists wherever land is owned by a federally 
recognized tribe. Federally recognized tribes, the Tribe contends, are “domestic dependent 
nations,” Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, supra, at 17, and thus ipso facto under the 
superintendence of the Federal Government. See Brief for Respondents 23–24. 
  This argument ignores our Indian country precedents, which indicate both that the 
Federal Government must take some action setting apart the land for the use of the 
Indians “as such,” and that it is the land in question, and not merely the Indian tribe 
inhabiting it, that must be under the superintendence of the Federal Government. See, e.g., 
United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539 (1938) (“The Reno Colony has been 
validly set apart for the use of the Indians. It is under the superintendence of the 
Government. The Government retains title to the lands which it permits the Indians to 
occupy”); United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 449 (1914) (noting that the Federal 
Government retained “ultimate control” over the allotments in question). 
 144. 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2006). 
 145. Id. § 479 (emphasis added). 
 146. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 383 (2009). 
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remaining reservation land in 1880.147 But, also like many tribes, it began 
buying back some its aboriginal land in an effort to restore its land base and 
regain its independent tribal status.148 The Tribe sought to recover its ancestral 
land, claiming that the State had misappropriated its territory in violation of the 
Indian Non-Intercourse Act.149 The claims were resolved by enactment of the 
Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act.150 The Tribe received title to 
1,800 acres of land in exchange for relinquishing all claims to land based on 
aboriginal title.151 In 1983, the tribe achieved federal recognition.152 In 1988, 
the Secretary of the Interior took the 1,800 acres into trust.153 When the tribe 
purchased some additional acreage in order to build tribal housing the state 
objected that the tribe was not conforming to applicable state and local 
codes.154 While that dispute was pending the Secretary took the thirty-one 
acres into trust.155 
The State challenged the Secretary’s decision to take the land into trust in 
the case of Carcieri v. Salazar.156 The State argued that the Secretary did not 
have the authority to take the land in trust for the Narragansett under the 
IRA.157 The language of the Act provided that the Secretary may take land into 
trust for Indian people.158 
  The term “Indian” as used in this Act shall include all persons of Indian 
descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal 
jurisdiction, and all persons who are descendants of such members who were, 
on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian 
reservation, and shall further include all other persons of one-half or more 
Indian blood.159 
Read the definition closely. To whom does the statute apply? 
Certainly the Narragansett qualify as Indian. They were recognized as such 
by the State since early in the eighteenth century.160 They lost their land as did 
most eastern Indians, and they reclaimed it through application of the Non-
 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 383–85. 
 149. Id. at 384; 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2006). 
 150. Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 384; 25 U.S.C. § 1701–16 (2006). 
 151. Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 384. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 385. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 385–87. 
 157. Id. at 382. 
 158. Id. at 381–82. 
 159. 25 U.S.C. § 479 (2006). 
 160. Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 383. 
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Intercourse Act.161 They did this without state or federal assistance and 
regained federal recognition in 1983.162 So what is the problem? According to 
the district court and the appeals court that heard this case the statute was 
ambiguous, and applying the rule of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.,163 giving deference to the reading of the agency so long 
as it is reasonable, they held that the action of the agency was permitted.164 
Yet, according to the Supreme Court the lower courts were wrong.165 
There was no ambiguity in the statute, and the agency acted beyond its 
authority.166 The charge of ambiguity pivoted on the critical word: now.167 
“The term ‘Indian’ as used in this Act shall include all persons of Indian 
descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal 
jurisdiction . . . .”168 According to the lower courts now could refer to the time 
the statute was applied or it could refer to the time the statute was passed.169 If 
it meant the former, there would be no problem.170 If it referred to the time the 
Act was passed, then the Narragansett lose since they did not receive federal 
recognition until 1983.171 There was no question that the Narragansett were 
recognized as a tribe.172 They had been since the initial encounter.173 Rhode 
Island itself was carved from their aboriginal land.174 According to the analysis 
the Court outlined in Sandoval and other cases, the Narragansett were clearly a 
tribe. Yet, because of the existence of the recognition process, the undisputed 
truth of their existence as a tribe, recognized even by the state that was 
opposing them, was of no moment. Now the State was taking shelter behind a 
statute that was passed “to conserve and develop Indian lands and resources” 
and that, in the same section that had the jurisdictional language, also said 
“The term ‘tribe’ wherever used in this Act shall be construed to refer to any 
Indian tribe, organized band, pueblo, or the Indians residing on one 
reservation.”175 It was as if the State had won that winter day in New Mexico 
in 1913. Only, now, the supposed trustee was a co-conspirator. 
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CONCLUSION 
When thinking about “who counts,” I initially titled this Essay: “Who is 
Counting and for What?” I wanted to highlight the role that power necessarily 
plays in the very asking of the question. It presumes a perspective, and 
interrogating that perspective can only occur if the second part of the question 
is answered. Because race has always played a critical role in our culture from 
the very beginning, I wanted to explore one of the many ways it has been 
deployed to justify a particular expression of power. The story virtually every 
American learns is the story of the inevitable continental expansion of the 
American Nation. It is not told as a story of coming to terms with a form of 
internal colonization filled with contradictions, complications, horrors, and 
graces. 
What is clear is that racial ideas are woven through the story of our 
national identity. That identity emerged as a series of oppositions in which race 
figured prominently, not just in the slave trade, but in the very conquest of the 
continent and beyond. 
Unlike Latin America, we do not have a detailed philosophical tradition 
exploring the question of whether Indians “count” as people with souls worth 
saving. Instead, we supplied a political answer that was premised on exclusion, 
but which was also informed by pre-existing ideas of racial hierarchy that used 
to justify treating Indians like political communities suitable of recognition 
framed by the law of nations. It would also be used, however, to strip these 
tribes of autonomy, resources, and humanity. Indians, whether in tribes or 
individual, would count in different ways but always for the purposes of the 
one doing the counting. 
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